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Abstract
Noninterference is typically used as a baseline security
policy to formalize confidentiality of secret information ma-
nipulated by a program. In contrast to static checking of
noninterference, this paper considers dynamic, automaton-
based, monitoring of information flow for a single execu-
tion of a concurrent program. The monitoring mechanism
is based on a combination of dynamic and static analyses.
During program execution, abstractions of program events
are sent to the automaton, which uses the abstractions to
track information flows and to control the execution by for-
bidding or editing dangerous actions. All monitored ex-
ecutions are proved to be noninterfering (soundness) and
executions of programs that are well-typed in a security
type system similar to the one of Smith and Volpano [23]
are proved to be unaltered by the monitor (partial trans-
parency).
1. Introduction
The proposed monitor for concurrent programs deals
with confidentiality, more precisely with noninterference
in concurrent programs. This notion has first been intro-
duced in [8] as the absence of strong dependency [6]. A
program is said to be noninterfering if the values of its pub-
lic (low) outputs do not depend on the values of its pri-
vate (high or secret) inputs. Static analyses for noninterfer-
ence [1–3, 14, 15, 17, 21, 25] have been studied extensively
and are well surveyed in [20].
The specificity of the approach lies in its decision unit
(execution and not program), its run-time nature and the
monitoring mechanism used (a security automaton). Sim-
ilar approaches lack formal proofs for the majority of
them [13, 24] and miss concurrency [11, 13, 22, 24] (even
†The author was partially supported by NSF grants CCR-0209205 and
CCR-0296182.
if some claim they do). Dealing with concurrency is re-
ally tricky as shown by the examples of Fig. 2 on synchro-
nization and Fig. 3 on shared variables in Sect. 2.3. The
monitor for concurrent programs introduced in this paper is
supported by formal proofs and guarantees confidentiality
of secret data: either the monitor deduces that the current
execution is noninterfering or it alters the behavior of the
execution to obtain a noninterfering execution.
There are three main benefits to this dynamic approach.
First, its decision unit — the fact that the analysis states
properties of executions and not programs — allows the
monitor to safely run noninterfering executions of unreli-
able programs. Then, its run-time nature makes it a “lazy”
polyvariant analysis. The monitor deals with any input par-
tition between private and public ones without requiring
prior analysis of any possible combinations. It can even
easily deal with varying partition. Finally, a monitor fol-
lows the precise control flow of a program and thus calcu-
lation of control dependencies (as might be performed in
static analyses) can be more accurate. Section 7 contains
an example illustrating this improved accuracy. A distin-
guishing feature, compared to other program monitors, lies
in the property overseen. Monitoring information flow is
more complicated than, e.g., monitoring divisions by zero,
since it must take into account not only the current state of
the program but also unexecuted commands.
The next section starts by presenting the syntax and se-
mantics of the studied language which includes a synchro-
nization command similar to the one used in [16]. It also in-
troduces the principles used by the monitoring mechanism.
Section 3 defines formally the security automaton which
is at the heart of the monitoring mechanism. The follow-
ing section characterizes the monitoring semantics which
links the monitoring automaton previously presented with
the standard semantics given in Sect. 2.1. Then, comes
an example in Sect. 5 which examines the evolution of the
monitoring automaton during a sample execution. Before
concluding in Sect. 7, the monitor soundness and partial
transparency are proved in Sect. 6.
2. Outline
A concurrent program is a pool of threads (Θ). Before
execution, each thread contains a sequential program. Such
a pool is formally defined as a partial function from integers
to sequential programs: Θ(i) is the ith sequential program
of the pool. The grammar of sequential programs is given
below. In order to gain simplicity while describing the se-
mantics, the grammar is split into four different blocks. In
this grammar, 〈ident〉 stands for a variable name (or identi-
fier). As in any programming language, variables have an
associated value which can be updated by an assignment.
In the concurrent setting, each variable has also an associ-
ated unique lock. Variable locks can be acquired and then
released by threads. Whenever a thread has acquired a lock
but not released it yet, this thread is said to own this lock. A
given lock can be owned by at most one thread at any time.
〈action〉 ::= 〈ident〉 := 〈expr〉 | output 〈expr〉 | skip
〈control〉 ::= if 〈expr〉 then 〈prog〉 else 〈prog〉 end
| while 〈expr〉 do 〈prog〉 done
| with 〈idSet〉 when 〈expr〉 do 〈prog〉 done
〈com〉 ::= 〈action〉 | 〈control〉
〈prog〉 ::= 〈prog〉 ; 〈prog〉 | 〈com〉
A sequential program (〈prog〉) is either a sequence of
sequential programs or a command (〈com〉). Actions
(〈action〉) and control commands (〈control〉) are the only
two types of commands. An action is either an assignment
of the value of an expression (〈expr〉) to a variable (〈ident〉),
an output of the value of an expression, or a skip statement.
A control command is either: a conditional executing one
program (out of two) depending on the value of an expres-
sion, a loop executing a program as long as the value of a
given expression remains true, or a synchronization com-
mand (with 〈idSet〉 when 〈expr〉 do 〈prog〉 done). This
command is executed — and therefore is replaced by the
program it encompasses — only if no other thread owns
one of the locks of the given set of variables (〈idSet〉) and
the value of the expression (〈expr〉) is true. Otherwise, the
thread executing this synchronization command is blocked
— i.e. it can not execute anything as long as the conditions
are not fulfilled.
The syntax of the synchronization command comes from
[4, 9, 16]. It has been chosen for its ability to encode eas-
ily lots of different synchronization constructions. It allows
the monitoring mechanism to deal with only one synchro-
nization construction while keeping the language expressive
with regard to synchronization.
2.1. Standard semantics
During the execution, a thread does not necessarily con-
tain a sequential program (〈prog〉) as defined above. In
fact, a thread under execution contains an execution state-
ment (〈execStat〉), which is either empty (∅), a usual se-
quential program (〈prog〉), an execution statement followed
by a sequential program (〈execStat〉 ; 〈prog〉), or a locked
statement (⊙〈ident-set〉[〈execStat〉]) carrying additional in-
formation about the locks owned by this particular thread.
The grammar of execution statements, which is based on the
grammar of sequential programs (〈prog〉), is given below.
〈execStat〉 ::= 〈prog〉 | 〈execStat〉 ; 〈prog〉
| ∅ | ⊙ 〈idSet〉[〈execStat〉]
A locked statement (⊙x̄[P ]) is obtained after the execution
of a synchronization command (with x̄when e do P done).
When a thread Θ(i) executes a synchronization command,
it acquires the locks of the variables given in parameter (x̄).
This information is registered in the program state to for-
bid other threads from acquiring those locks as long as the
thread Θ(i) has not released them. However, the thread
Θ(i) is still allowed to execute synchronization commands
on those locks — i.e. acquire again the same locks. The
information needed to allow a thread to acquire again the
same lock is not registered in the program state. The locks
a given thread is allowed to acquire again are registered in
its sequential program itself by the substitution of the syn-
chronization command just evaluated by a locked statement.
This locked statement contains the variables whose locks
have just been acquired and the program to be executed
while holding those locks.
Let study one execution step of the following thread.
1 with x when true do
2 with x when b do sk ip done
3 done;
4 with y when true do sk ip done
If the lock of variable x is not owned by any other thread
then one execution step of the previous thread can take place
and yields the following program.
1 ⊙x [with x when b do skip done];
2 with y when true do sk ip done
As the thread studied is now the owner of x’s lock, it will be
allowed to acquire again this lock at its next execution step.
Execution statement semantics. The semantics of con-
current programs is based on the semantics of execution
statements which is described in Fig. 1. This latter seman-
tics is based on rules written in the format: 〈| ς ⊢ S |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς ′ ⊢ S′ |〉. The rules mean that in the execution state ς
statement S evaluates to statement S′ yielding state ς ′ and
output sequence o. Let X be the domain of variable identi-
fiers and D be the semantic domain of values. An execution
state ς is a pair (σ, λ) composed of a value store σ (X → D)
and a lock set λ (2X). σ maps variable identifiers to their
respective current value. The definition of value stores is
extended to expressions, so that σ(e) is the value of the ex-
pression e in a program state whose value store is σ. λ is a
set of variable identifiers. It corresponds to the set of vari-
ables whose lock is currently owned by a thread. An output
sequence is a word in D⋆. It is either an empty sequence
(written ǫ), a single value (for example, σ(e)) or the con-
catenation of two other sequences (written o1 o2).
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ x := e |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ[x 7→ σ(e)], λ) ⊢ ∅ |〉
〈| ς ⊢ output e |〉
σ(e)
−−−→
S
〈| ς ⊢ ∅ |〉
〈| ς ⊢ skip |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| ς ⊢ ∅ |〉
σ(e) = v
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ if e then Strue else Sfalse end |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ Sv |〉
σ(e) = true
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ while e do Sl done |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ Sl ; while e do Sl done |〉
σ(e) = false
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ while e do Sl done |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ ∅ |〉
x̄ ∩ λ = ∅ σ(e) = true
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ with x̄ when e do Ss done |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ, λ ∪ x̄) ⊢ ⊙x̄[Ss] |〉
〈| ς ⊢ ∅ ; St |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| ς ⊢ St |〉
〈| ς ⊢ Sh |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς ′ ⊢ Sh
′
|〉
〈| ς ⊢ Sh ; St |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς ′ ⊢ Sh
′
; St |〉
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ ⊙x̄[∅] |〉
ǫ
−→
S
〈| (σ, λ \ x̄) ⊢ ∅ |〉
〈| (σ, λ \ x̄) ⊢ Ss |〉
o
−→
S
〈| (σ′, λ′) ⊢ Ss
′
|〉
〈| (σ, λ) ⊢ ⊙x̄[Ss] |〉
o
−→
S
〈| (σ′, λ′ ∪ x̄) ⊢ ⊙x̄[Ss
′
] |〉
Figure 1. Standard semantics
As shown in Fig. 1, if the prerequisites allow it, the exe-
cution of a synchronization command yields a locked state-
ment, ⊙x̄[P], where x̄ is a set of variable identifiers. This
rule states that if the conditions hold, a synchronization
command is replaced by the program P it includes. The
current thread will now own the locks of the variables be-
longing to x̄.
Concurrent program semantics. A concurrent program
under execution is a pool of execution statements. Taking
one execution step of a concurrent program means taking
one execution step for one of the execution statements of
the thread pool. There is no constraint on which thread has
to be evaluated. The scheduler used for the thread interleav-
ing is a nondeterministic one. After each step of execution,
the next thread to execute is nondeterministically selected
among those which can take an execution step. Such a
scheduler avoids timing covert channels which are based on
the hypothesis that the attacker is able to guess accurately in
which order the scheduler will execute the different threads.
When dealing with schedulers which are deterministic, so-
lutions proposed in [18] should be applicable.
The semantics of unmonitored executions of concurrent
programs (pool of threads) is given by the following rule:
ı ∈ dom(Θ) 〈| ς ⊢ Θ(ı) |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς ′ ⊢ S′ı |〉
〈| ς ⊢ Θ |〉
o
−→
S
〈| ς ′ ⊢ Θ[ı 7→ S′ı] |〉
2.2. Monitoring principles
The mechanism developed in this paper is a monitor aim-
ing at enforcing the confidentiality of private data manipu-
lated by any concurrent program. In order to achieve this
goal, the monitoring mechanism is designed to enforce a
stronger property based on the notion of noninterference.
The informal definition of this notion [8] states that a pro-
gram is “safe” if its private inputs have no influence on the
observable behavior of the program. This definition is stated
at the level of the program (at the level of all its executions
as a whole). On the other hand, a monitor acts at the level
of one execution and not of all executions of a program. It
is then necessary to refine the notion of noninterference in
order for it to be applicable to a single execution.
Terminology used to describe flows in this paper differs
slightly from the terminology used in the literature on static
analyses. In this paper, the flow from the right part of an
assignment (the expression) to the left part (the variable) is
called a direct flow. The flow from the test of a conditional
to a variable, whose value is modified by an assignment in
one branch of the conditional, is called an indirect flow —
an explicit indirect flow if the assignment is executed and an
implicit indirect flow if the assignment is not executed.
The remainder of the current section starts by giving
some definitions which are then used to define formally the
notion of noninterference for executions. Subsequently, it
provides a short description of the way the monitor works.
Finally, by commenting upon two examples of concurrent
programs, it illustrates some of the difficulties of monitor-
ing noninterference and the solutions adopted.
What is a noninterfering concurrent execution? In or-
der to prove noninterference soundness in Sect. 6.1 and state
formally the effect of the monitor, it is required first to de-
fine precisely “noninterference” in our concurrent setting.
A program P is said to be noninterfering if and only if its
private inputs have no influence on the observable behavior
of the program. This is usually characterized as follows:
any two executions of P started with the same public inputs
— but potentially different private inputs — have the exact
same observable behavior. It is then required to compare the
observable behavior of different executions. In this paper,
the observable behavior is the output sequence generated.
The output sequence generated by the evaluation of a given
sequential program started in a given state is unique. How-
ever, the output sequence generated by the evaluation of a
given concurrent program — a pool of sequential programs
— started in a given state is not. For multi-threaded pro-
grams, the output sequence generated by the execution of a
given program started in a given state depends on the thread
interleaving which occurred during the evaluation. There-
fore, the definition of the observable behavior of an execu-
tion designated by a program and an initial state must take
into account all such possible output sequences. Addition-
ally, as it is also desired to take into account non-terminating
executions, our definition of observable behavior must also
take into consideration the observable behavior of an exe-
cution at any step of its evaluation, not only the final one.
Definition 2.1 states that the observable behavior — output
sequences — of the execution of a given concurrent pro-
gram started in a given state is the set of all prefixes of any
output sequence which can be obtained by any thread inter-
leaving.
This paper defines two small-step semantics: a standard
semantics (−→S) in Fig. 1, and a monitoring semantics (−→M)
in Fig. 5. Let −→s denote any of those semantics. For
all small-step semantics (−→s),
o
−→s represent one execution
step yielding the output sequence o; and
o
−→⋆s represent any
number of execution steps, which together yield the output
sequence o.
o1−→⋆s is the reflexive and transitive closure of
o2−→s. Let X denote a program state, either from the stan-
dard semantics or the monitoring semantics.
Definition 2.1 (Observable behavior: O[[Θ]]sX).
For all small-step semantics −→s, concurrent programs Θ,
and program states X , the observable behavior of the exe-
cution with the semantics −→s of the concurrent program Θ
started in the initial state X , written O[[Θ]]sX , is the set:
{ o | ∃ X ′,Θ′ : 〈|X ⊢ Θ |〉
o
−→⋆s 〈|X
′ ⊢ Θ′ |〉 }
The monitoring mechanism does not determine if a pro-
gram is or is not noninterfering, but if a precise execution
is or is not noninterfering. It has then to determine if, by
looking at the current output sequence, it is possible to dif-
ferentiate the current execution from executions of the same
program started with the same public inputs but potentially
different private inputs. This is possible only if the output
sequence, the observable behavior, of the current execution
— which follows a precise thread interleaving — of the pro-
gram P can not be produced, for any thread interleaving,
from another initial state X2 having the same public inputs;
in other words, only if there exists an initial state X2 such
that the output sequence of the current execution does not
belong to O[[Θ]]sX2. Definition 2.3 characterizes a nonin-
terfering execution as an execution whose output sequence
belongs to the observable behavior — which is independent
from the thread interleaving — of any execution of the same
program started in an initial state low equivalent (Defini-
tion 2.2) to the initial state of the current execution. In the
following definitions, by convention, in any initial program
state, no locks are owned by any thread.
Definition 2.2 (Low Equivalent Initial States).
Two initial states X1, respectively X2, containing the value
stores σ1, respectively σ2, are low equivalent with regards
to a set of variables V , written X1
V
= X2, if and only if the
value of any variable belonging to V is the same in σ1 and
σ2:
X1
V
= X2 ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ V : σ1(x) = σ2(x)
Definition 2.3 (Noninterfering Execution).
Let V c be the complement of V in the set X. For all small-
step semantics −→s, concurrent programs Θ, program states
X1 and output sequences o, an execution with the semantics
−→s of the initialized program (Θ, X1) generating the output
sequence o is noninterfering, written ni(Θ, s,X1, o), if and
only if, for any program state X2:
X1
S(Θ)c
= X2 ⇒ o ∈ O[[Θ]]sX2
How does the monitor enforce noninterference? As in
[11], the monitoring mechanism is separated into two parts.
The first element, described in Sect. 4, is a special seman-
tics which delegates the main job to a security automaton
described in Sect. 3. The purpose of the special semantics
is to select and abstract the important events, with regard
to noninterference, which occur during the execution. The
abstractions of those events are then sent to the security au-
tomaton. For each input received, the automaton sends back
to the semantics an output. Depending on those outputs re-
ceived, the special semantics modifies the normal execu-
tion of the program. The security automaton is in charge of
keeping track of the variables whose value carries variety
— i.e. their value is influenced by the values of the pri-
vate inputs — and keeping track of variety in the context
of execution — i.e. the program counter — of each thread
independently.
With regard to synchronization commands, the solu-
tion adopted follows standard solutions found in the liter-
ature [19]. Synchronizations inside the branch of a condi-
tional whose branching condition is influenced by the pri-
vate inputs are forbidden. However, it is impossible to stop
the execution when encountering a synchronization com-
mand inside a conditional whose branching condition car-
ries variety. Doing so would create a new covert channel
leaking information to low level users if a public output
was supposed to occur later in the execution. One solu-
tion would be to ignore synchronization commands in a
context carrying variety. The drawback of this solution is
to suppress synchronizations that the programmer deemed
wise to include. The solution adopted in this monitor is to
force any synchronization to occur outside any conditional
whose branching expression carries variety. Whenever the
monitoring mechanism has to evaluate such a conditional, it
executes the locking part of any synchronization command
appearing in any branch of the conditional.
2.3. The monitor by the example
Synchronization commands are interference prone.
Fig. 2 contains the code of a concurrent program. It is com-
posed of two threads, has a single private input (h) and uses
an internal variable v which is never output. The first thread
(Fig. 2(a)) takes the lock of the variable v and then outputs
“a” followed by “b” before releasing the lock. The second
thread (Fig. 2(b)) outputs “c”; then, if the private input h is
true, it tries to acquire the lock of v and then releases it
immediately; finally, it outputs “d”. What can be deduced
1 with v
2 when true do
3 output "a";
4 v := v + 1;
5 output "b"
6 done
(a) Thread Θ(1)
1 output "c";
2 i f h then
3 with v when true do
4 v := v + 2;
5 done
6 e l s e sk ip end;
7 output "d"
(b) Thread Θ(2)
Figure 2. Leakage due to synchronization
by a low level user if it sees the output sequence “a c d b”?
From the code of thread Θ(1), it is possible to deduce that
the first thread owns the lock of v at least from the time the
program outputs “a” until it outputs “b”. Consequently, as
“c” and “d” are output between “a” and “b”, thread Θ(2)
has evaluated every command between the two outputs of
“c” and “d” without needing to acquire the lock of v. It is
then easy, by looking at the code of Θ(2), to deduce that
the private input h is false. The “bad” flow from h to the
output sequence is due to the synchronization commands on
v.
To prevent the “bad” flow presented above, it is not a
good idea to simply stop the execution whenever a syn-
chronization command has to be execute inside a condi-
tional whose condition carries variety. In the example pre-
sented, the synchronization command in Θ(2) is not exe-
cuted. Stopping the program each time the program has to
evaluate a conditional whose condition carries variety and
which contains a synchronization command is not appeal-
ing either. And, it does not seem wise to ignore any syn-
chronization command inside a conditional whose condi-
tion carries variety. There may be a good reason for hav-
ing one synchronization command in the previous example,
avoiding a concurrent write access to the variable v. The
solution adopted by the monitoring mechanism presented
in this paper consists in acquiring all the locks of any syn-
chronization command appearing in any branch of a con-
ditional whose condition carries variety before evaluating
such a conditional. This mechanism prevents the program
from outputting “a c d b” even if h is false.
Be cagey with newsmongers. Fig. 3(a) contains the code
of a Very Important Program (VIP) which has a single pri-
vate input (h) and is run concurrently with the program in
Fig. 3(b). This latter program is a newsmonger which out-
puts indefinitely and as fast as it can some of the variables
manipulated by the VIP (x and y). The VIP only sets x to 0,
then y to 0 and finally resets both to 1. However, depending
on the value of its private input, it resets first x or y to 1.
The interference comes from the newsmonger. If the news-
1 x := 0; y :=0;
2 i f h then
3 x := 1; y := 1
4 e l s e
5 y := 1; x := 1
6 end;
(a) VIP
1 whi le true do
2 output x;
3 output y;
4 done
(b) Newsmonger
Figure 3. Leakage due to concurrent access
monger is lucky enough, and the VIP unlucky enough, the
scheduler will let the newsmonger take at least two steps,
so outputting x and y, while the VIP is in the middle of re-
setting those variables to 1. It is then easy, depending on
which one of x and y has been reset to 1 first, to deduce the
value of the private input h. The newsmonger is able to steal
the value of the private input of an unmonitored execution
of the VIP. Less intuitively, it is also possible, if the sched-
uler gives a high priority to the newsmonger, to deduce the
value of h if the execution is supervised by a monitor which
takes into account indirect flows created by an assignment
only when this assignment is evaluated. The reason is that,
in between the two assignments resetting x and y to 1, those
two variables do not have the same security level. Conse-
quently, such a “bad” monitor does not act the same way for
the commands “output x” and “output y” if only one of x
and y has been reset to 1.
The monitoring mechanism proposed in this paper takes
into account an indirect flow as soon as the conditional
which is the source of this flow is executed. For any execu-
tion of the VIP, this means that x and y get a high security
level at the same time — when the conditional branching on
h is first evaluated. Therefore, the monitor has the same be-
havior for the two commands “output x” and “output y”,
to output a default value instead of the value of x or y. The
newsmonger is then unable to steal the VIP’s secret.
Section 5 follows precisely the behavior of the monitor-
ing mechanism on an example. Before that, the next two
sections give a formal definition of the monitoring mecha-
nism: first of the security automaton used, and then of the
special semantics communicating with this automaton.
3. The monitoring automaton
This section describes the automaton used in the moni-
toring mechanism. It is in charge of tracking the informa-
tion flows and controlling the execution in order to enforce
noninterference. The semantics described in Sect. 4 sends
abstractions of the execution events to this automaton. In
turn, the automaton sends back directions to the semantics
to control the execution, thus enforcing noninterference.
Definitions coming in the remaining of the document use
extensively the following notations. For any set S, let 2S be
the power set of S. For any set A, let A⋆ be the set of all
strings over the alphabet A. And finally, for any program
P whose variables belongs to X, let the set of private input
variables be S(P) (S(P) ⊆ X).
General definition. The preceding sections presented the
monitoring mechanism as if it is using a single monitor-
ing automaton. However, the monitoring automaton for a
concurrent program is defined by first defining monitoring
automata for sequential programs. A concurrent program is
a pool of threads, each of which contains a single sequen-
tial program. Each time the “automaton” of the concurrent
program Θ receives an input φ, generated by an evaluation
step in a sequential program Θ(i), a state for the monitoring
automaton of Θ(i) is extracted from the state of the moni-
toring automaton of Θ. Then, the monitoring automaton for
sequential programs takes a transition on input φ generating
output ψ. Finally, the state of the monitoring automaton of
Θ is updated using the new state returned by the transition
of the monitoring automaton for sequential programs and
the output ψ is sent back to the monitoring semantics.
For any program P, let X be the set of variables of P.
The automaton enforcing noninterference for the sequential
program P is the tuple A(P) = (Q,Φ,Ψ, δ, q0) where:
• Q is a set of states;
Q = 2X × (X → N) × 2X × {⊤,⊥}⋆
• Φ is the input alphabet, constituted of abstractions of a
subset of program events, specified below;
• Ψ is the output alphabet, constituted of execution con-
trolling commands, specified below;
• δ is a partial transition function;
δ : (Q× Φ) −→ (Ψ ×Q)
• q0, an element of Q, is the start state.
q0 = (S(P), ∅, ∅, ǫ)
The automaton states. An automaton state is a quadruple
(V,W,L,w) composed of two sets (V and L) of variables
belonging to X, a multiset (W ) of variables belonging to X
and a word (w) belonging to a language whose alphabet is
{⊤,⊥}. At any step of the execution, V contains all the
variables which may carry variety — i.e. whose values may
have been influenced by the initial values of the secret input
variables (S(P)). L contains the variables whose lock may
be owned by a thread at an “equivalent” step of an execu-
tion of the same program started with the same public inputs
but potentially different private inputs. L is the part of the
automaton state which protects secret data against attacks
similar to the one described in the example about synchro-
nization commands on the preceding page. W contains at
least once each variable which is assigned in a branch of a
still active conditional whose condition carries variety. For
example, at any step of the execution of line 3 or 5 of the
program in Figure 3(a), W contains x and y. W is the part
of the automaton state which protects secret data against
attacks similar to the one described in the newsmonger’s
example on the previous page. w, called a branching con-
text, tracks variety in the context of the execution with re-
gard to previous branching commands. The context consists
in the level of variety the conditions of the previous, but
still active, branching commands. If w contains ⊤, then the
statement executed was initially a branch of a conditional
whose test may have been influenced by the initial values of
S(P). Hence this statement may not be executed with a dif-
ferent choice of initial values for the private input variables
(S(P)).
Automaton inputs. The input alphabet of the automaton
(Φ) contains abstractions of some events that can occur dur-
ing an execution. The alphabet Φ consists of the following:
“branch(λ, e, P e, P u)” is generated each time a condi-
tional is evaluated. λ is the set of variables whose
lock is currently owned by a thread, e is the expression
whose value determines the branch which is executed,
P e is the branch which will be executed, and P u is the
branch which will not be executed. For example, be-
fore evaluation of “if x > 10 then S1 else S2 end”,
the input “branch(λ, x > 10, S1, S2)” is sent to the
monitoring automaton if x is greater than 10.
“merge(P e, P u)” is generated each time a conditional has
been fully evaluated. P e is the branch which has been
executed, and P u is the branch which has not been
executed. For example, after evaluation of “if x >
10 then S1 else S2 end”, the input “merge(S1, S2)”
is sent to the monitoring automaton if x > 10.
“sync(x̄, e)” is generated before any synchronization
command. For example, with x, b when b do Ss done
generates the input “sync({x, b}, b)”.
any atomic action of the language (assignment, skip or out-
put statement) which has to be evaluated is first sent to
the automaton for validation before its execution.
Automaton outputs. The automaton outputs are sent
back from the automaton to the monitoring semantics in or-
der to control the execution. The output alphabet (Ψ) is
composed of the following:
“OK” is used whenever the monitoring automaton allows
an execution step that it could have altered or denied.
“NO” is used whenever the monitoring automaton forbids
the execution step. This step is simply skipped by the
monitored execution.
any atomic action of the language. This is the answer
of the monitoring automaton whenever another action
than the current one has to be executed.
Automaton transitions. Figure 4 specifies the transition
function of the automaton. A transition rule is written
(q, φ)
ψ
−→ q′. It reads as follows: in the state q, on reception
of the input φ, the automaton moves to state q′ and outputs
ψ.
Let FV(e) be the set of variables occurring in e. For
example, FV(x+y) returns the set {x, y}. Let defines(S) be
the set of all variables which may be defined by an execution
of S. This function is used in order to take into account
the implicit indirect flows created when a conditional whose
condition carries variety is evaluated. A formal definition of
this function follows:
defines(x := e) = {x}
defines(output e) = defines(skip) = ∅
defines(S ; S′) = defines(S) ∪ defines(S′)
defines(if e then S else S′ end) = defines(S) ∪ defines(S′)
defines(while e do S done) = defines(S)
defines(with x̄ when e do S done) = defines(S)
Let needs(S) be the set of all variables whose lock may
be required in order to execute S. This function is used
by the monitoring automaton in order to “virtually” acquire
all the locks which may be needed for the complete evalua-
tion of a conditional whose condition carries variety. Those
locks are not acquired by the current thread. They will be
only when their corresponding synchronization command
will be executed. However, the monitoring automaton reg-
isters them in its state. Before allowing the evaluation of a
conditional whose condition carries variety, the automaton
checks that there is no needed lock which is already reg-
istered in the automaton state for an other thread. This is
done in order to make sure that the evaluation of the branch
designated by the condition — which carries variety — can
not be stopped because of a needed lock which would be
owned by an other thread. A formal definition of needs(S)
follows:
needs(x := e) = needs(output e) = needs(skip) = ∅
needs(S ; S′) = needs(S) ∪ needs(S′)
needs(if e then S else S′ end) = needs(S) ∪ needs(S′)
needs(while e do S done) = needs(S)
needs(with x̄ when e do S done) = x̄ ∪ needs(S)
Finally, let stops(S) be true if the execution of S may
be “stopped”: either by looping or waiting on a synchro-
nization command for the value of an expression to become
trueor false. This function is used by the automaton
when finishing the complete evaluation of any conditional
whose condition carries variety. This is done in order to
prevent an attacker to learn some secret information by ob-
serving from the source code that, under some conditions,
one of the branches of a conditional, whose condition car-
ries variety, can not terminate. This function does not take
into consideration the locks needed by a synchronization
command. The reason being that the security automaton en-
sures that no secret information can flow through the lock
state of shared variables. This is dealt by the set L in the
automaton state. stops(S) is formally defined as follows:
stops(x := e) = stops(output e) = stops(skip) = false
stops(S ; S′) = stops(S) ∨ stops(S′)
stops(if e then S else S′ end) = stops(S) ∨ stops(S′)
stops(while e do S done) ≡ e 6= false
stops(with x̄ when e do S done) ≡ e 6= true
Figure 4 shows that the automaton forbids (NO) or edits
(output θ) only executions of output statements. For other
inputs, it either allows the evaluation of the statement — a
transition exists for the current input in the current state —
or forces the monitoring semantics to take an execution step
for another thread — there is no transition for the current
input in the current state. Whenever a transition occurs,
the automaton tracks, in the set V , the variables that may
contain secret information — have variety. Additionally,
it registers, in W , the variables whose variety may evolve
differently due to a conditional whose condition carries va-
riety; it tracks, in L, the variables whose lock status may
carry variety; and it tracks, in w, the variety of the branch-
ing conditions.
Inputs “branch(λ, e, P e, P u)” are generated at entry
points of conditionals. On reception of such inputs in state
(V,W,L,w), if the conditional to be evaluated belongs to a
branch of a conditional whose condition carries variety (w
does not belong to {⊥}⋆) then the automaton simply pushes
⊥ to the end of w. Otherwise, the automaton checks if the
branching condition (e) carries variety. To do so, it com-
putes the intersection of the variables appearing in e with
the set V . If the intersection is empty, then the condition
of the branching statement does not carry variety. In that
case, the automaton simply pushes ⊥ to the end of w. If the
intersection is not empty, then the value of e may be influ-
enced by the initial values of S(P). If this is the case then
the automaton checks if the execution can proceed with-
out being stopped by a lock that it can not acquire. To do
so, it verifies that there is no needed lock which is already
owned by another thread or has already been booked previ-
ously for the execution of a conditional of an other thread
(l̃ ∩ (λ ∪ L) = ∅). If all needed locks are available, the
automaton pushes ⊤ to the end of w, registers the needed
locks in the new automaton state and deals with indirect
flows. This is done by adding all variables which may be
assigned to in one of the branches of the conditional into
the set of variables potentially carrying variety (V ) and into
the multiset of variables whose order of assignment may
carry variety (W ).
Whenever an execution exits a branch — which is a
member of a conditional c — the input “merge(P e, P u)”
is sent to the automaton. On reception of such input, the
automaton checks if other values of private inputs may have
induced the execution of the conditional to be stopped. This
((V,W,L,w), branch(λ, e, P e, P u))
OK
−−→
(V,W,L,w⊥)
iff
{
FV(e) ∩ V = ∅
∨ w 6∈ {⊥}⋆
((V,W,L,w), branch(λ, e, P e, P u))
OK
−−→
(V ∪ ṽ,W ⊎ ṽ, L ∪ l̃, w⊤)
with
{
ṽ = defines(P e) ∪ defines(P u)
l̃ = needs(P e) ∪ needs(P u)
iff



FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅
∧ w ∈ {⊥}⋆
∧ l̃ ∩ (λ ∪ L) = ∅
((V,W,L,w⊥), merge(P e, P u))
OK
−−→ (V,W,L,w)
((V,W,L,w⊤), merge(P e, P u))
OK
−−→
(V,W \ ṽ, L \ l̃, w)
with
{
ṽ = defines(P e) ∪ defines(P u)
l̃ = needs(P e) ∪ needs(P u)
iff
{
¬stops(P e)
∧ ¬stops(P u)
((V,W,L,w), sync(x̄, e))
OK
−−→ (V,W,L,w)
iff



FV(e) ∩ V = ∅
∧ ( w /∈ {⊥}⋆
∨ x̄ ∩ L = ∅ )
(q, skip)
OK
−−→ q
((V,W,L,w), x := e)
OK
−−→ (V ∪ {x},W,L,w)
iff
{
FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅
∨ x ∈W
((V,W,L,w), x := e)
OK
−−→ (V \ {x},W,L,w)
iff
{
FV(e) ∩ V = ∅
∧ x /∈W
((V,W,L,w), output e)
OK
−−→ (V,W,L,w)
iff w ∈ {⊥}⋆ and FV(e) ∩ V = ∅
((V,W,L,w), output e)
output δ
−−−−−→ (V,W,L,w)
iff w ∈ {⊥}⋆ and FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅
((V,W,L,w), output e)
NO
−−→ (V,W,L,w)
iff w 6∈ {⊥}⋆
Figure 4. Transition function
is the case if the condition of c carries variety — w ends
with ⊤ — and the function stops() concludes that at least
one of the branches of c can get stuck. If that is not the case,
the automaton allows the evaluation step and the last letter
of w is removed. Additionally, if c is the first conditional
whose condition carries variety in this sequential program,
the variables added into the multisetW for protection while
executing c are removed from the multiset.
Before executing any synchronization command, an in-
put of type “sync(x̄, e)” is sent. The automaton allows the
evaluation step only if the expression in the synchronization
command does not carry variety and either the needed locks
are not reserved (x̄ ∩ L = ∅) or the automaton has already
booked those locks for the current thread.
Atomic actions (assignment, skip or output) are sent to
the automaton to validate their execution. The action skip is
considered safe because the noninterference definition con-
sidered in this work is not time sensitive. Hence the au-
tomaton always authorizes its execution by outputting OK.
On reception of an input “x := e” the automa-
ton deals only with direct flows; indirect flows are al-
ready taken care for by the processing of inputs of type
“branch(λ, e, P e, P u)”. Hence, on input x := e, the au-
tomaton only checks if the value of e carries variety. This
is the case only if FV(e) and V are not disjoint. If the value
of e carries variety, then x (the variable modified) is added
to V : V ′ = V ∪ {x}. Otherwise x receives a new value
which is not influenced by S(P). In that case, V ′ equals
V \ {x}. This makes the mechanism flow-sensitive. There
is an exception to this rule. If there exists an indirect flow to
x from the condition carrying variety of a still active condi-
tional then the x must not be removed from the set of vari-
ables carrying variety. If such an indirect flow exists then
the assigned variable is still under the protection acquired
when the corresponding “branch(λ, e, P e, P u)” input has
been processed (x ∈W ). In that case, the variable is left in
the set V . Other parts of the automaton state do not change.
The rules for the automata input, “output e,” prevent bad
flows through two different channels. The first channel is
the actual content of what is output. In a public context,
(w ∈ {⊥}⋆), if the program tries to output a secret (i.e.,
the intersection of V and the variables in e is not empty),
then the value of the output is replaced by a default value,
the constant δ. This value can be a message informing the
user that, for security reasons, the output has been denied.
To do so, the automaton outputs a new output statement to
execute in place of the current one. The second channel
is the generation of an output by itself. This channel exists
because, depending on the path followed, some outputs may
or may not be executed. Hence, if the automaton detects
that this output may not be executed with different values
for S(P) (the context carries variety) then any output must
be forbidden; and the automaton outputs NO.
The automaton states for concurrent programs. Moni-
toring automaton states for concurrent programs are similar
to the automata states for sequential programs. An automa-
ton state is a quadruple Q = (V,W,L,w) which belongs to
the following set:
2X × (X → N) × 2X × (N → {⊤,⊥}⋆)
V , W and L are directly inherited from automata states for
sequential programs. w is a function mapping thread iden-
tifiers to their respective branching context (as defined for
sequential programs).
The functions used to extract, respectively update, the
automaton state for a given thread from, respectively into,
the automaton state of the concurrent program are defined
below.
extract((V,W,L,w), ı) = (V,W,L,w(ı))
update((V,W,L,w), ı, (V ′,W ′, L′, w′)) =
(V ′,W ′, L′, w[ı 7→ w′])
The current section defines formally the monitoring au-
tomata. Among other things, it defines an input alphabet
and an output alphabet which are used to communicate with
the monitoring semantics. This semantics, described in the
next section, is in charge of the concrete evaluation of the
concurrent program under the supervision of the monitoring
automaton.
4. The monitoring semantics
During a monitored execution, a thread contains a
monitored statement (〈monitStat〉) which is hihgly sim-
ilar to the execution statements described in Fig. 1.
The only difference is the addition of branched state-
ments (⊗(〈prog〉, 〈prog〉)[〈monitStat〉]). The statement
⊗(P e, Pu)[S] states that statement S is a partial execution
of P e — i.e., S is the result of the application of some exe-
cution steps to P e — and that P e is the executed branch of
a conditional whose unexecuted branch is Pu. The rule for
if-statements of Fig. 5 gives a good intuition of the mean-
ing of this statement. The grammar of monitored statements
follows. It is based on the grammar of sequential programs
given on page 2.
〈monitStat〉 ::= 〈prog〉 | 〈monitStat〉 ; 〈prog〉
| ∅ | ⊙ 〈idSet〉[〈monitStat〉]
| ⊗(〈prog〉, 〈prog〉)[〈monitStat〉]
Thread semantics. The monitoring semantics of concur-
rent programs is based on the semantics of monitored state-
ments which is described in Fig. 5. In this figure, A and A′
denote atomic actions (skip statement, assignment or out-
put statement). The monitoring semantics is based on rules
written in the format: 〈| ζ ⊢ S |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ ′ ⊢ S′ |〉. It reads
as follows: in monitored execution state ζ, monitored state-
ment S evaluates to S′ yielding state ζ ′ and output sequence
o. A monitored execution state ζ is a pair (ς, q) composed
of an execution state (ς), of the standard semantics, and a
monitoring automaton state (q), as defined in Sect. 3.
The semantics of monitored statements interacts with
the security automaton using automaton transitions written
(q, φ)
ψ
−→ q′. It also uses the semantics of execution state-
ments — the standard semantics — for the evaluation of
actions (assignments, outputs, or skip statements). Both se-
mantics can be distinguished by the letter appearing on the
bottom right of the arrow (M for the monitoring semantics
and nothing for the standard semantics).
There are three rules for atomic actions: skip, x := e and
output e. There is one rule for each possible automaton
answer to the action executed. Either the automaton autho-
rizes the execution (OK), denies the execution (NO), or
replaces the action by another one. The rules use the stan-
dard semantics (Fig. 1) when an action must be executed. In
the case where the execution is denied, the evaluation omits
the current action (as if the action was ”skip”). For the case
where, on reception of input A, the monitoring automaton
returns A′, the monitoring semantics executes A′ instead of
A. Note from Fig. 4, that A′ can only be the action that
outputs the default value (output θ).
For conditionals, the evaluation begins by sending to the
automaton the input “branch(λ, e, P e, Pu)” where λ is the
set of variables whose lock is currently owned by a thread,
e is the test of the conditional, P e is the “branch” which
will be executed and Pu is the “branch” which will not be
executed. After the evaluation step, the monitored execu-
tion state is updated with the automaton state returned by
the monitoring automaton and the conditional evaluated is
replaced by the branch to execute.
“with x̄ when e do P s done”, a synchronization com-
mand, can be evaluated only if the needed locks (x̄) are
not currently owned by another thread, the condition e is
true, and the monitoring automaton allows the evaluation
on reception of the input “sync(x̄, e)”. After the evaluation
step, the needed locks are added to the set of locks currently
owned by a thread, the automaton state is updated, and the
command is replaced by a locked statement indicating that
the locks x̄ are owned by the current thread for the evalua-
tion of the program P s.
Evaluating a branched statement (⊗(P e, P u)[Sb]) is
equivalent to evaluating the enclosed statement Sb as long
as this statement is not completely evaluated. If the evalua-
tion of Sb is completed then the input “merge(P e, P u)” is
sent to the automaton and the evaluation of the thread can
proceed only if the automaton allows it.
In order to take one evaluation step of a locked statement
(⊙x̄[Ss]), the set of locks x̄ is temporarily removed from the
set of owned locks in the execution state. Then, one evalua-
(q, A)
OK
−−→ q′ 〈| ς ⊢ A |〉
o
−→ 〈| ς ′ ⊢ ∅ |〉
〈| (ς, q) ⊢ A |〉
o
−→
M
〈| (ς ′, q′) ⊢ ∅ |〉
(q, A)
A′
−→ q′ 〈| ς ⊢ A′ |〉
o
−→ 〈| ς ′ ⊢ ∅ |〉
〈| (ς, q) ⊢ A |〉
o
−→
M
〈| (ς ′, q′) ⊢ ∅ |〉
(q, A)
NO
−−→ q′
〈| (ς, q) ⊢ A |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς, q′) ⊢ ∅ |〉
σ(e) = v (q, branch(λ, e, P v, P¬v))
OK
−−→ q′
〈| (ς, q) ⊢ if e then P true else P false end |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς, q′) ⊢ ⊗(P v, P¬v)[P v] |〉
P true = P l ; while e do P l done P false = ∅
σ(e) = v (q, branch(λ, e, P v, P¬v))
OK
−−→ q′
〈| (ς, q) ⊢ while e do P l done |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς, q′) ⊢ ⊗(P v, P¬v)[P v] |〉
x̄ ∩ λ = ∅ σ(e) = true
(q, sync(x̄, e))
OK
−−→ q′
〈| ((σ, λ), q) ⊢ with x̄ when e do P s done |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| ((σ, λ ∪ x̄), q′) ⊢ ⊙x̄[P s] |〉
〈| ζ ⊢ ∅ ; St |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| ζ ⊢ St |〉
〈| ζ ⊢ Sh |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ ′ ⊢ Sh
′
|〉
〈| ζ ⊢ Sh ; St |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ ′ ⊢ Sh
′
; St |〉
(q, merge(P e, P u))
OK
−−→ q′
〈| (ς, q) ⊢ ⊗(P e, P u)[∅] |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| (ς, q′) ⊢ ∅ |〉
〈| ζ ⊢ Sb |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ ′ ⊢ Sb
′
|〉
〈| ζ ⊢ ⊗(P e, P u)[Sb] |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ζ ′ ⊢ ⊗(P e, P u)[Sb
′
] |〉
〈| ((σ, λ), q) ⊢ ⊙x̄[∅] |〉
ǫ
−→
M
〈| ((σ, λ \ x̄), q′) ⊢ ∅ |〉
〈| ((σ, λ \ x̄), q) ⊢ Ss |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ((σ′, λ′), q′) ⊢ Ss
′
|〉
〈| ((σ, λ), q) ⊢ ⊙x̄[Ss] |〉
o
−→
M
〈| ((σ′, λ′ ∪ x̄), q′) ⊢ ⊙x̄[Ss
′
] |〉
Figure 5. Monitoring semantics
tion step is taken for Ss and the locks x̄ are put back in the
set of owned locks in the execution state if the evaluation of
Ss is not completed.
Concurrent program semantics. As explained in
Sect. 3, the automaton states for monitoring the execution
of a single thread are different from the states for monitor-
ing concurrent programs. The monitoring semantics uses
two functions, described in Sect. 3, for converting between
automaton states for thread and automaton states for con-
current programs. The semantics of monitored executions
of concurrent programs is given by the following rule:
ı ∈ dom(Θ)
〈| (ς, extract(Q, ı)) ⊢ Θ(ı) |〉
o
−→
M
〈| (ς ′, q) ⊢ S′ı |〉
〈| (ς, Q) ⊢ Θ |〉
o
−→
M
〈| (ς ′, update(Q, ı, q)) ⊢ Θ[ı 7→ S′ı] |〉
Initial state of a monitored concurrent execution.
There is a unique initial state for monitoring the execution
of a given concurrent program with a given initial value
store. Definition 4.1 states that the initial state of the mon-
itored execution of a concurrent program is the monitoring
execution state whose initial value store is the given one,
whose set of owned lock is empty and whose automaton
state designates the value of the private inputs as the only
elements carrying variety.
Definition 4.1 (Initial State of Monitored Executions).
For all concurrent programs Θ and value stores σ, the initial
state of the monitored execution of Θ with initial value store
σ, written ζIΘ,σ , is:
( (σ, ∅), (S(Θ), ∅, ∅, {i 7→ ǫ | i ∈ dom(Θ)}) )
5. Example of monitored execution
Figure 6 is an example of a concurrent program having
two threads. Fig. 6(a) contains the code of the sequential
program of the first thread and Fig. 6(b) contains the code of
the second thread. This program has only one private input
(h) and no public input. It uses three internal variables (v, b
and x). Both threads attempt to write in the variable v. Both
assignments to v are protected by a synchronization on the
lock of v. Additionally, before assigning a value to v, the
second thread waits for b to be true. After assigning a
value to v, the second thread outputs twice the value of x.
The first thread, depending on the value of the private input
h, either assigns a value to x and outputs “a”, or assigns a
value to v. The last command evaluated by the first thread
resets the value of x to 0.
Table 1 shows the evolution of the monitoring automaton
for an execution of the program of Fig. 6. This execution
starts in an initial state where the private input h is true, b
1 i f h then
2 x := 1;
3 output "a"
4 e l s e
5 with v when true do
6 v := v - 1
7 done
8 end;
9 x := 0
(a) Thread Θ(1)
1 with v
2 when b do
3 v := v + 1
4 done;
5 output x;
6 output x
(b) Thread Θ(2)
Figure 6. Another concurrent program
is true and x = v = 0. As the program has only one private
input (h) and two threads, the initial state of the monitoring
automaton is the following one: ({h}, ∅, ∅, [1 7→ ǫ, 2 7→ ǫ]).
The execution’s steps are numbered on the left. The first
column of the table shows the value of the program coun-
ters of the two threads. “ı ⊲ ” and “ı ◮ ” indicates that
the program counter of the ıth thread maps to the line . 0
is used for  when the execution of the thread is completed.
◮ is used to designate the thread which will be evaluated
at this execution step. The following column contains the
event abstractions which are sent by the semantics to the
automaton. In this column, P t stands for the lines 2 to 3 of
the first thread and P f stands for the lines 5 to 7 of the first
thread. Then comes the answer of the automaton telling
the semantics what action to take. The 4th column gives
the new state of the automaton following the transition trig-
gered by the automaton input that is shown on the same line
(the automaton state before the transition is the one of the
preceding line). Finally, the last column lists the actions
which are actually evaluated by the monitored execution of
the program.
At the execution step 2, the only thread which can be ex-
ecuted is the second one. The reason is that at the preceding
step, the second thread took the lock of v. The first com-
mand to be executed by the first thread is a conditional con-
taining a synchronization command on v. Therefore, to ex-
ecute the first thread, the monitor requires this thread to be
able to acquire the lock of v. This is impossible as this lock
is owned by the second thread. Hence, even if the branch
to be executed is not the one containing the synchronization
command, the program can not evaluate the conditional of
the first thread. An example that justifies this rule has been
given in Fig. 2.
Execution step 3 evaluates the conditional of the first
thread. This conditional, whose condition carries variety,
contains an assignment to x in one branch and an assign-
ment to v in the other one. In order to prevent an attack
similar to the one exposed in Fig. 3, the monitor considers
Table 1. Example of the automaton evolution during an execution.
Program Automaton: Actions
counters input output new state executed
1 1 ⊲ 1 2 ◮ 1 sync({v}, b) OK ({h} , ∅ , ∅ , [1>ǫ, 2>ǫ])
2 1 ⊲ 1 2 ◮ 2 v := v + 1 OK ({h} , ∅ , ∅ , [1>ǫ, 2>ǫ]) v := v + 1
3 1 ◮ 1 2 ⊲ 4 branch(∅, h, P t, P f ) OK ({h, x, v}, {x, v}, {v}, [1>⊤, 2>ǫ])
4 1 ⊲ 2 2 ◮ 4 output x output θ ({h, x, v}, {x, v}, {v}, [1>⊤, 2>ǫ]) output θ
5 1 ◮ 2 2 ⊲ 5 x := 1 OK ({h, x, v}, {x, v}, {v}, [1>⊤, 2>ǫ]) x := 1
6 1 ◮ 3 2 ⊲ 5 output ”a” NO ({h, x, v}, {x, v}, {v}, [1>⊤, 2>ǫ])
7 1 ◮ 8 2 ⊲ 5 merge(P t, P f ) OK ({h, x, v}, ∅ , ∅ , [1>ǫ, 2>ǫ])
8 1 ◮ 9 2 ⊲ 5 x := 0 OK ({h, v} , ∅ , ∅ , [1>ǫ, 2>ǫ]) x := 0
9 1 ⊲ 0 2 ◮ 5 output x OK ({h, v} , ∅ , ∅ , [1>ǫ, 2>ǫ]) output x
those variables (x and v) as carrying variety straight away,
even if there respective assignments have not been evaluated
yet. This is done by adding the variables to the first element
of the new automaton state. A clever newsmonger may try
to dupe the monitor into believing that those variables do
not carry variety anymore by resetting their value. To pre-
vent it, the monitor also registers that those variables carry
variety because of the processing of a conditional. This is
done by adding them into the multiset which is the second
element of the new state. Variables x and v will appear at
least once in this multiset as long as the processing of the
conditional which added them into it is not over. Further-
more, as stated in the explanation of step 2, the first thread
acquires the lock of v because the conditional processed at
this step is conditioned by an expression carrying variety
and contains a synchronization command on v in one of its
branches. Finally, the monitor registers the new context of
execution — reflecting the fact that the branch that will be
executed depend on an expression carrying variety — by
pushing ⊤ into the branching context of the first thread in
the new state.
In step 4 of the execution, the second thread attempts
to output the value of x. This variable belongs to the first
element of the automaton state before the transition. This
means that the value of x may carry variety. Therefore, the
monitor replaces the value of x by a default value. It allows
the user to know that an output as been prevented for secu-
rity reasons. Five steps later, at step 9, the second thread
tries again to output the value of x. However, in the mean-
while, the first thread has reset the value of x to a new value.
Doing so, it removed the variety in this variable. This is re-
flected by the fact that x does not belong anymore to the first
element of the automaton state. Therefore, the monitoring
automaton lets the output occur.
In step 6 of the execution, the first thread attempts to
output a constant while still in one of the branch of a con-
ditional whose condition carried variety. This is an unsafe
behavior that the monitor forbids. Consequently, the execu-
tion simply skips this command.
This section shows an example for which the monitoring
mechanism is able to ensure the confidentiality of private
inputs. The next section proves this fact for any monitored
execution.
6. Properties of the monitoring mechanism
After formally defining the monitoring mechanism, this
section collates the monitor’s characteristics to the stan-
dard properties of soundness with regards to noninterfer-
ence and, specific to monitors, transparency with regards
to the output sequence generated. A monitor is transparent
with regard to a program behavior if, for any execution, this
behavior is the same whether the execution is monitored or
not. Section 6.1 proves the soundness of the monitoring
mechanism with regard to the notion of noninterference.
However, it is of course impossible for it to be complete,
as the noninterference problem is undecidable. As well, it
is impossible to have a sound and transparent monitor for
noninterference, as with an interfering execution the mon-
itor can be either transparent or sound but not both. How-
ever, Sect. 6.2 still proves that the monitor is transparent for
a nontrivial set of executions.
6.1. Soundness
The monitoring mechanism is proved to be sound with
regard to the noninterference property for executions. This
means that, for any output sequences generated during the
monitored execution of any program Θ started in the ini-
tial state ζIΘ,σ and value stores σ
′ low equivalent to σ, there
exists a thread interleaving such that during the monitored
execution of Θ started in the initial state ζIΘ,σ′ the same out-
put sequence is generated. This property is formally stated
by theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.1 (Soundness).
For all programs Θ and value stores σ, any monitored exe-
cution of Θ started in the initial state ζIΘ,σ is noninterfering.
For any output sequence o, this is formally stated as follows:
o ∈ O[[Θ]]Mζ
I
Θ,σ ⇒ ni(Θ, M, ζ
I
Θ,σ, o)
Proof sketch. The proof — which can be found in [10] —
goes by induction on the derivation tree of the current ex-
ecution (ec). First, it relies on the fact that, because of the
monitoring mechanism, for any evaluation started with the
same public inputs there exists an execution (e2) having a
thread interleaving “similar” to the one of the current execu-
tion. Additionally, it is demonstrated that, if a thread of e2
follows a path in its sequential program different from the
path followed by the equivalent thread in ec, nothing will
be output by those threads until they reach an “equivalent
state”. It is then possible to show that ec and e2 have the
same output sequence.
6.2. Partial transparency
A common property stated for monitors is transparency.
A transparent monitor is one that does not alter the behav-
ior of the monitored program. An interfering execution has,
with regard to confidentiality, a faulty observable behavior.
Therefore, a sound monitor enforcing noninterference has
to alter the observable behavior of such an execution. Con-
sequently, it is impossible for a sound monitor enforcing
noninterference to also be transparent. However, for a pre-
cise set of programs, it is possible to prove that the mon-
itoring mechanism presented in this paper achieves trans-
parency — i.e. it does not alter the observable behavior of
any execution of those programs. This set of programs is
the set of all programs which are well-typed under a type
system similar to the one of Smith and Volpano [23].
This type system is described in Figure 7. The language
used in this paper includes two structures which do not ap-
pear in the language used in [23]. The two typing rules
added for those structures are the only salient differences
with the type system of Smith and Volpano [23]. The lattice
of types used has only two elements and is defined using the
reflexive relation ≤ (L ≤ H). L is the type for public data
and H the type for private data. The typing environment, γ,
prescribes types for identifiers and is extended to handle ex-
pressions. γ(e) is the type of the expression e in the typing
environment γ. It is equal to the least upper bound of the
types of the free variables appearing in e, or L if there is no
free variable in e. It is formally defined as follows:
γ(e) =
⊔
x∈FV(e)
γ(x)
For any sequential program P, if “γ ⊢ P : τ cmd” for some
τ and γ in which every secret input is typed secret — i.e.
∀x ∈ S(P), γ(x) = H — then P is said to be well-typed un-
der the typing environment γ. For any concurrent program
Θ, if all its threads contain a program well-typed under the
same typing environment γ, then Θ is said to be well-typed
under this typing environment γ. This is written “γ ⊢ Θ”.
γ ⊢ skip : τ cmd
γ(e) ≤ L
γ ⊢ output e : L cmd
γ(e) ≤ γ(x) τ ≤ γ(x)
γ ⊢ x := e : τ cmd
γ ⊢ Sh : τ cmd γ ⊢ St : τ cmd
γ ⊢ Sh ; St : τ cmd
γ(e) ≤ τ ′ τ ≤ τ ′
γ ⊢ Strue : τ ′ cmd γ ⊢ Sfalse : τ ′ cmd
γ ⊢ if e then Strue else Sfalse end : τ cmd
γ(e) ≤ L γ ⊢ Sl : L cmd
γ ⊢ while e do Sl done : L cmd
γ(e) ≤ L γ ⊢ Ss : L cmd
γ ⊢ with x̄ when e do Ss done : L cmd
Figure 7. Type system for confidentiality
Theorem 6.2 states that the monitoring mechanism does
not alter executions of well-typed programs. In other words,
the monitoring mechanism is transparent for any well-typed
program. To understand that the monitor is transparent, and
still sound, for a bigger set of programs, consider the con-
current program composed only of this sequential program:
x := h; x :=0; output x. h is the only secret input.
Every execution is noninterfering. But as the type system
is flow insensitive, this program is ill-typed. However, the
monitoring mechanism does not interfere with the outputs
of this program while still guaranteeing that any monitored
execution is noninterfering.
Theorem 6.2 (Partial Transparency: monitoring preserves
type-safe programs).
For all programs Θ with secret inputs S(Θ), typing environ-
ments γ with variables belonging to S(Θ) typed secret, and
value stores σ, if Θ is well-typed under γ then any mon-
itored execution of Θ started in the initial state ζIΘ,σ out-
puts a sequence which belongs to the observable behavior
of the unmonitored execution of Θ started in the initial state
(σ, ∅). This is formally stated as follows:
γ ⊢ Θ ⇒ O[[Θ]]Mζ
I
Θ,σ = O[[Θ]]S(σ, ∅)
Proof sketch. The proof — which can be found in [10] —
goes by induction on the derivation tree of the typing judg-
ment. It shows that for any well-typed program, the ad-
ditional constraints imposed by the monitoring mechanism
for a “normal” execution are always true. Therefore, the ob-
servable behaviors of monitored or unmonitored executions
of a well-typed program are the same.
7. Conclusion
This paper addresses the matter of confidentiality in con-
current programs. This problem is formalized using the
noninterference property which states that a program is safe
if and only if its publicly observable behavior is not influ-
enced by the values of its private inputs. The solution pro-
posed consists in a monitoring mechanism enforcing non-
interference on the fly. It is defined as a special seman-
tics communicating with a security automaton. The role of
the semantics is to send abstractions of the events occurring
during the execution to the automaton. Then, it executes
the program in accordance to the answers sent back by the
automaton. This latter tracks the information flows and con-
trols — allows, modifies or denies — the execution of out-
put statements and synchronization commands. Section 6
not only proves that this monitoring mechanism is sound, in
the sense that it enforces noninterference for any execution,
but also that it is transparent for any program well-typed
under a type system similar to the one of Smith and Vol-
pano [23].
7.1. Related work
The vast majority of research on noninterference con-
cerns static analyses and involves type systems [20]. Some
“real size” languages together with security type system
have been developed (for example, JFlow/JIF [15] and
FlowCaml [17]).
Dynamic information flow analyses [5, 7, 26, 27] are not
as popular as static analyses for information flow, but there
has been interesting research. For example, RIFLE [24] is
a complete runtime information flow security system based
on an architectural framework and a binary translator. Masri
et al. [13] present a dynamic information flow analysis for
structured or unstructured languages. However, both works
lack a final formal proof of noninterference. Both works
propose to stop execution as soon as a “bad” flow is de-
tected. This behavior creates a new covert channel that can
reveal secret information — see, e.g., [12]. Moreover, when
multi-threaded programs are handled by [13], an informa-
tion leakage can arise in the example of Fig. 3. The reason
is that, depending on the value of the branching condition,
indirect flows are not taken into account in the same or-
der. Shroff et al. [22] propose two dynamic information
flow analyses for sequential programs which are supported
by formal proofs. The first one is a purely dynamic anal-
ysis which increases its knowledge about indirect flows as
the number of executions increase. This analysis will even-
tually detect all information flows after an undetermined
number of executions. The second dynamic analysis is run
with a prior knowledge of the indirect flows existing in any
execution of the analyzed program. This knowledge is ob-
tained by executing, at compile time, a static analysis com-
puting a fixed point of dependencies. The proposed analyses
are more precise than the majority of flow-insensitive static
analyses. However, Shroff et al.’s analyses are not fully
flow-sensitive, and indirect flows are handle in a “static”
way which must reflect indirect flows in any possible exe-
cutions. Therefore, the proposed dynamic analyses does not
take a full advantage of their dynamic nature. For example,
their analyses are unable to “safely” detect that any execu-
tion of the following program, where h is the only secret
input, is noninterfering.
i f h then x := 1 e l s e sk ip end;
x := 0; output x
7.2. Specifics of the approach
To the author’s knowledge, the solution proposed in this
paper is the only dynamic analysis supported by formal
proofs dealing with noninterference in a concurrent set-
ting including synchronization commands. As the proposed
mechanism deals with noninterference, which is not a prop-
erty of an execution trace, it significantly differs from usual
monitors. The dynamic analysis proposed is required to
take into account the content of branches which are not ex-
ecuted. Additionally, due to the fact that synchronization
is interference prone, it is also required to change the posi-
tion of synchronization commands while still enforcing the
thread interleaving constraints induced by the original posi-
tion of those commands.
There are two main advantages of monitors over static
analyses. First, static analyses have to take into considera-
tion all possible executions of the program analyzed. This
implies that if a single execution is unsafe then the program
(thus all its executions) is rejected. Whereas, even if some
executions of a program are unsafe, a monitor still allows
this program to be used. The unsafe executions, which are
not useful, are altered to respect the desired property while
the safe executions are still usable. Moreover, a monitor-
ing mechanism may be more precise than static analyses
because during execution the monitor gets some accurate
information about the “path behavior” of the program. As
an example, let us consider the following program where h
is the only private input and l the only public input.
i f ( f( l ) ) then t := h e l s e sk ip end;
i f ( g( l ) ) then x := t e l s e sk ip end;
output x
Without information on f and g (and often, even with), a
static analysis would conclude that this program is unsafe
because the secret input information could be carried to x
through t and then to the output. However, if f and g are
such that no value of l makes both predicates true, then any
execution of the program is perfectly safe. In that case, the
monitor would allow any execution of this program. The
reason is that, l being a public input, only executions follow-
ing the same path as the current execution are taken care of
by the monitoring mechanism. So, for such configurations
where the branching conditions are not influenced by the
secret inputs, a monitoring mechanism is at least as precise
as any static analysis — and often more precise.
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